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COMMENTS
BANKRUPTCY-CONTEMPT--PRESUMPTIONS-FINALITY OF TURNOVER ORDERS IN CONTEMPT ACTIONS AND THE PRESUMPTION OF
CoNTINUED PossESSION-Problems of jurisprudence and bankruptcy
are raised by Maggio v. Zeitz,1 a recent decision of the United States
Supreme Court. The facts were these: In April, I942, the Luma
1

333 U.S. 56, 68 S.Ct. 401 (1948).
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Camera Service was adjudged a bankrupt. Defendant was its principal
officer. The bankrupt's books showed a large and unusual merchandise
shortage for November and December, 1941. Despite defendant's
denial, the referee and district judge were satisfied that defendant
had extracted the property from the estate before bankruptcy. But
'there was no evidence that defendant retained the goods or their proceeds. Relying on a presumption of continued possession, the referee
ordered defendant to return the property or the proceeds, set at
$17,500. The turnover order was affirmed by the district court in
December, 1943.2 The circuit court of appeals affirmed,3 and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.4 Defendant did not obey the order,
and in a contempt action he reiterated his inability to comply and
his denial of the taking. But he was committed for contempt of court
in June, 1945; he would-stay in jail, said the order, until he produced
the property or $17,500. The primary basis <?f committal was the
presumption of continued possession. The circuit court of appeals
again affirmed,5 but stated that the presumption was :fictitious and that
the court knew that defendant could not comply with the order. On
certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the district
court for further proceedings. Justice Jackson, for the majority, stated
that while the basis of the turnover order is res judicata, present possession is in issue in the contempt proceeding, and rigid application of
the presumption of continued possession is unwarranted. Justices Black
and Rutledge felt that the entire proceeding was illegal, and wanted
the case dismissed. Justice Frankfurter dissented.
l

The turnover order is a judicial gloss on the Bankruptcy Act.
While there are criminal sanctions for fraudulent concealment by
bankrupts,6 "criminal prosecutions do not recover concealed treasure." 7
The desire to recover hidden assets led to the turnover order and its
summary nature. Specific justification, however, is more illusory. The
2

ln re Luma Camera Service, Inc., (D.C. N.Y. 1943) 57 F. Supp. 632.
Without opinion, Zeitz v. Maggio, (C.C.A. 2d, 1944) 145 F. (2d) 241.
4
324 U.S. 841, 65 S.Ct. 587 (1945).
5
In re Luma Camera Service, Inc., (C.C.A. 2d, 1946) 157 F. (2d) 951. "Although we know that Maggio cannot comply with the order, we must keep a straight
face and pretend that he can, and must thus affirm orders which .first direct Maggio 'to
do an impossibility and then punish him for refusal to perform it.'" Id. at 955.
Judge Frank wrote the opinion, in which Judge L. Hand concurred. Judge Swan
concurred in the result. Noted, 95 UNiv. PA. L. REv. 789 (1947); 42 ILL. L. REv.
396 (1947).
6 Bankruptcy Act, § 29(b), 52 Stat. L. 842 at 855 (1938), II U.S.C. (1940)
§ 52(b).
7
Principal case at 404.
3
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statute enjoins bankruptcy courts to "cause the estates of bankrupts to
be collected"; 8 they may make such orders "as may be necessary for
the enforcement of the provisions of this Act." 9 But these are generalizations, and prove very little.10 Another argument often advanced is
that the very assumption of possession of the bankrupt's estate leads to
two results: power to issue and enforce orders which will make the
jurisdiction mean something,11 and power to make the trial of issues
speedy and ancillary to the main action ( that is, summary rather than
plenary) .12
Justices Black and Rutledge are not convinced by this rationale.
They would wait for Congressional authorization before sanctioning
procedure which culminates in imprisonment of the defendant. Their
opinion, however, appears unique in judicial circles, for the courts have
had no trouble in finding a basis for jurisdiction in the limited number
8
Bankruptcy Act,§ 2(a)7, 52 Stat. L. 842 at 843 (1938), II U.S.C. (1940)
§ 11{a)7.
9 Bankruptcy Act, § 2(a}15, 52 Stat. L. 842 at 843 (1938), II U.S.C. (1940)
§ 11{a)15.
10
Section 2 (a) 7, id., is an aid in establishing jurisdiction; but re the summary
nature of the proceedings (see note l 2, infra), the language is harmful rather than helpful.
There is a clause stating that the courts have this jurisdiction "except as herein otherwise provided." And section 23, id. at 854, clearly contemplates plenary suits. But
see Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S. 642, 67 S.Ct. 1443 (1947), noted in 33 VA. L.
REv. 764 (1947).
Section 2(a) 15, 52 Stat. L. 842 at 843 (1938) proves too much so far as the
summary character of the suit is concerned. If it authorizes summary procedure in
any case, it authorizes it in every case-an argument negatived by other terms of
the act.
The act specifically provides for summary jurisdiction in §§ 41{b), 5o(n),
57(1), 57{n), and 67(a)4. Expressio unius est exclusio dterius-?
See note 12, infra.
1 1. Mueller v. Nugent, 184 U.S. 1, 22 S.Ct. 269 (1902); Marcus v. Pennsylvania Trust Co. of Pittsburgh, (C.C.A. 3d, 1927) 23 F. (2d) 303, and bankruptcy
cases cited at 304; Morehouse v. Pacific Hardware and Steel Co., (C.C.A. 9th, 1910)
177 F. 337; In re Purvine, (C.C.A. 5th, 1899) 96 F. 192. On the "inherent''
power of any court to punish for contempt of its orders, see Ex Parte Robinson,
19 Wall. {86 U.S.) 505 at 510 {1874), and other cases cited in this footnote.
2
1. See Murphy v. John Hofman Co., 211 U.S. 562 at 568, 29 S.Ct. 154 (1909);
Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller v. Fox, 264 U.S. 426, 44 S.Ct. 396 (1924); Ross, "Federal
Jurisdiction in Suits by Trustees in Bankruptcy," 20 lowA L. REv. 565 (1935);
Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S. 642, 67 S.Ct. 1443 (1947), noted in 33 VA. L. REV.
764 ( I 947). "Summary'' proceedings are generally of a speedy and informal character;
a "plenary'' action is full-blown and time-consuming. For the advantages of a fast
administration in bankruptcy and the countervailing caution that efficiency may breed
injustice, see Joint Hearings before Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary on S. 3866, 72d Cong., 1st. sess., p. 608 (1932).
The vagaries of "constructive possession" bringing jurisdiction and summary·
procedure are detailed in comment, 40 CoL. L. REV. 489 ( I 940). See 5 REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY, 4th ed.,§ 2400 (1936).
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of cases in which defendants have bothered to raise the issue. 18 The
profession has quite generally assumed that the turnover order is a
plausible method for enforcing the statute.14 The Maggio case confirms this assumption. But the holding does not dispose of all the jurisdictional problems: defendant did not have a jury trial before he was
jailed, and he may well claim that he is being imprisoned for debt.
Since the chancellor's hold on bankruptcy existed long before the
Constitution,15 the denial of jury trial is seldom questioned. What
questioning is recorded in the books, however, is directed toward the
guarantee of a jury in civil actions.16 The general constitutional grant
of bankruptcy power 17 contains no words suggesting common law
jurisdiction,18 and it is therefore reasonable to assume that no such
radical change was anticipated when the Constitution was drafted. But
should the grant of power be construed to exclude jury trial when
,the action is criminal? That the present Court would so conclude is
doubtful, to say the least.19 Justice Black's objection is predicated on
the thesis that the turnover order is essentially a judicial substitute
for criminal proceedings for the bankrupt's fraudulent concealment
of assets. His theory, then, is not the kind to be dismissed by a casual
reference to the history of equity jurisdiction ·in bankruptcy. Yet his
objection is based upon an assumption which the courts have uniformly
held unwarranted: that the turnover-contempt process is an unjustified assertion of legislative power by the judiciary.20
18

See cases in notes I I and I 2, supra.
The assumption is implicit, of course, in every turnover case. The :flat
statements in 2 CoLLIER, BANKRUPTCY, 14th ed., 517 (1940), and 5 REMINGTON,
BANKRUPTCY, 4th ed., § 2401 (1936), seem to reflect the long understanding of
the profession.
15
The first English bankruptcy act vested jurisdiction in the Chancellor, Equitable jurisdiction has continued ever since. See 8 HoLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw, 2d ed., 238 (1937).
16 Holding that the denial of jury· trial is constitutional, Hirschfield v. Bryant,
(C.C.A. 8th, 1926) 14 F. (2d) 931; Kattelman v. Madden, (C.C.A. 8th, 1937)
88 F. (2d) 858.
17 "The Congress shall have power • • • to establish . . • uniform laws on the
subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8.
18 "In suits at common law ••• the right of trial by jury shall be preserved. . . ."
U.S. Const., Amendments, Art. VII.
19 "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury.••." U.S. Const., Amendments, Art. VI. But see
cases holding defendant in criminal contempt of a turnover order: Morehouse v.
Pacific Hardware and Steel Co., (C.C.A. 9th, 1910) 177 F. 337; Clay v. Waters,
(C.C.A. 8th, 1910) 178 F. 385; Matter of Ferri; (D.C. Mo. 1911) 33 Am. Bank.
Rep. 565. The Sixth Amendment, of course, does not apply to criminal contempt
proceedings. See note 27, infra. That it does apply to full-dress criminal prosecutions,
see 2 CoLLIER, BANKRUPTCY, 14th ed., § 19.07 (1940).
2
Frontier justice is obviously not the only alternative to jury trial. Defendant
surely receives a fair hearing from a modern federal judge. See the language in Walker
14

°
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Justices Black and Rutledge also believe that the contempt committal constitutes imprisonment for debt, and is thus in violation of
the federal statute 21 which prohibits such imprisonment if the state
where the district court is sitting so declares. 22 Again a battery of
precedent may be levelled against this view. 23 Implicit in the cases is
the feeling that the desirability of efficient enforcement devices against
the bankrupt outweighs judicial and legislative abhorrence of imprisonment for debt. An analogy is the contempt action in alimony cases. 24
But if the refusal to pay alimony is caused only by financial inability,
defendant is not in contempt,25 and the committal regains its character
of imprisonment for debt. Of course if we concede that the finding of
continued possession is correct, there is no basis whatever for calling
v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1875), holding that the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not include jury trial. But defendants may be wary of the mercies
of bankruptcy judges surfeited with tall tales. Consider the sympathy of Judge
Augustus Hand: "The stories of bankrupts who conceal assets have assumed a form almost
as conventional as the plots one finds in the plays of Plautus and Terence. Indeed,
if they were told with art and possessed more fertility of imagination, a new anthology
might be gathered for American literature from the bankruptcy field. As •it is, they
contain little more than standardized forms of falsehood so often reiterated as to be
neither credible nor interesting." In re Abesbaum, (C.C.A. 2d, 1934) 70 F. (2d) .
628.
21
28 U.S.C. (1940) § 843, 14 Stat. L. 543 (1867). No case found discusses
the "fraud" exception to some imprisonment for debt prohibitions with reference to
bankrupts' original fraudulent taking. Would the present court determine that the
purpose of the Bankruptcy Act imports a Congressional exception to the above statute?
22
Justice Black is not so specific as the text suggests. He says that the procedure
"flavors too much of the old discredited practise of imprisonment for debts-debts
which people are unable to pay." Principal case at 413. New York, where the district
court sat in the Maggio case, has no constitutional objection to imprisonment for debt.
Nor does the federal Constitution. Justice Black's remarks are probably directed toward
a desirable policy for the judiciary when Congress has not spoken--or are not intended
for the particular case at bar.
28
See, e.g., Mueller v. Nugent, 184 U.S. I a_t 13, 22 S.Ct. 269 (1902); In re
Rosser, (C.C.A. 8th, 1900) IOI F. 562; I CoLLIER, BANKRUPTCY, 14th ed., 247
( I 940). If a return of books of account is ordered, the problem is obviously different
in many respects. See McGovern, "Aspects of the Turnover Proceeding in Bankruptcy," 9 FoRDHAM L. REv. 313 at 318-332 (1940).
Logically extended, Justice Black's reasoning would apply to 'the criminal prosecution for fraudulent concealment ( note 6, supra). But this part of the Bankruptcy
Act would surely be considered an exception to the statute noted in note 21, supra.
See also .22, supra.
24
See annotation, 30 A.L.R. 130 (1924).
25
Annotation, 22 A.L.R. 1256 (1923), supplemented in 31 A.L.R. 649 (1924),
40 A.L.R. 546 (1926), 76 A.L.R. 390 (1932), 120 A.L.R. 703 (1939). The statement that inability to pay is not excused where it is caused by plaintiff's "fault" does
not seem supported by the cases, if "fault" is used in the sense of previous fraud or error.
See Register v. State, 8 Minn. 185 (1863), reaffirmed in dictum, Hurd v. Hurd, 63
Minn. 443 at 445, 65 N.W. 728 (1896); see note 48, infra.
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the turnover order imprisonment for debt. Assuming possession, the
procedure is directly parallel to a court's order to a testamentary
trustee to distribute assets ~n his hands; or a direction to a bankruptcy
trustee to pay a dividend. The central issue, then, is the measure of
proof required in demonstrating ability to pay. And this is the real
problem in turnover cases.
2

The law must act on probabilities, not certainties. 26 "Proof" is
a question -of degree. Yet a large measure of probability in turnover
cases may be obtained by placing the burden of proof on the trustee,
and demanding "clear and convincing'' evidence of the bankrupt's possession. This is the rule of Oriel v. Russell,21 reaffirmed in the Maggio
case. But it is usually very difficult for the trustee to secure evidence
of the bankrupt's possession,28 and, to aid him, the lower federal courts
have used the presumption that goods once traced to a person remain
in his possession until the contrary appears. 20 The force of this presumption has varied among the several circuit courts of appeals; 30 but
in some circuits, particularly the second, the presumption is often the
whole basis for meeting the burden of proof, even when such previous possession as is proved occurred long before the turnover order.81
This is a presumption based on policy, not logic.82 Proof of the
original taking is not difficult, relatively speaking. But without the
presumption of continued possession, trustees are hamstrung by bankrupts' notable reluctance to reveal the present resting place of the
26 "Every year if not every day we must wager our salvation upon some prophecy
based upon imperfect knowledge." Holmes, J., dissenting, in Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616 at 624, 630, 40 S.Ct. 17 (1919).
27 278 U.S. 358, 49 S.Ct. 173 (1929). In the Maggio case the Court dismisses
Justice Black's suggestion of a "beyond reasonable doubt" test by saying 1that this is
not a criminal contempt proceeding. See Moskovitz, "Contempt of Injunctions,
Civil and Criminal," 43 CoL. L. REv. 780 at 783, 818 (1943); I CoLLIER, BANKRUPTCY, 14th ed., 244 (1940). Would the Court uphold a commital for criminal
contempt of a turnover order? See note 19, supra.
28 See McGovern, "Aspects of the Turnover Proceeding in Bankruptcy," 9
FORDHAM L. REv. 313 at 332, 333 (1940).
29 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., § 382 (1940); 9 id., § 2530.
30 The cases are myriad and the views of the circuit courts of appeal various. For
an excellent summary of those views, see 42 ILL. L. REv. 396 (1947).
81 Justice Frankfurter collects many of the cases in his dissenting opinion,
principal case at 417, note 17. At page 414 he explains the Second Circuit's peculiar
doctrine of precedent, which led, for example, to affirmance of the contempt commital
in the Maggio case although two of the three judges were unalterably opposed to its
basis and the Supreme Court had not spoken. Other collections of cases in the Second
Circuit and other circuits "rigidly applying" the presumption: McGovern, "Aspects
of ·the Turnover Proceeding in Bankruptcy," 9 FoRDHAM L. REv. 313 at 321-329
(1940); principal case at 403;· 42 ILL. L. REV, 396 at 399 (1947).
32 See THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 314 (1898).
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property or money which they have extracted.88 If the bankrupt wishes
to rebut the presumption by showing what he did with the property,
he may do so: all agree that this is a "presumption of fact." 84 But
the bankrupt's rebuttal involves an admission of criminal liability for
the original taking,85 and his reticence is understandable. It is easy to
answer that if he did commit a crime the law should not be chary of
his feelings, and that a forced admission still accomplishes results from
the point of view of bankruptcy administration. This, however, is an
admission that the presumption is based on policy, and does not elicit
the truth of present possession. The lack of rebuttal is not all that is
artificial in this picture. As Judge Learned Hand put it, "there is
not the slightest reason to suppose that such loot remains unspent in
the hands" of the bankrupt.86 If money or salable merchandise is
extracted, the whole character of the transaction points to quick dissipation. When yesterday's possession is shown, today's possession is
logical; but when many months have elapsed and the presumption is
used to sustain the whole burden of proof, it is clear that policy alone
supports the result.
This raises several fundamental questions. The first is whether a
turnover order retains its character as a civil proceeding, and an order
for "return" of property or proceeds, when it is not bottomed on the
fact that defendant retains the goods or money. Justice Black's contentions about jury trial and imprisonment for debt take on color and
substance in this context.87 And a due process consideration enters the
scene.88 A presumption must have some rational connection with the
fact to be proved to be valid under the Fifth 80 and Fourteenth Amendments.40 Although the Supreme Court's opinion in the Maggio case
88

See note 28, supra.
McGovern, "Aspects of the l'urnover Proceeding in Bankruptcy," 9 FoRDHAM L. REv. 313 at 319 (1940). See 9 W1GMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., § 2491
(1940 ).
85
See note 6, supra.
86
Robbin v. Gottbetter, (C.C.A. 2d, 1943) 134 F. (2d) 843 at 844.
87
Justice Black does not seem to rest his contentions on the fact that the presumption of continued possession is a fiction. But he quotes Judge Frank's remarks in the
lower court: "We would hold that a turnover proceeding may not, via a fiction, be
substituted for a criminal prosecution so as to deprive a man of a basic constitutional
right, the right of trial by jury." In re Luma Camera Service, (C.C.A. 2d, 1946)
157 F. (2d) 951 at 953-954 (1946). (Italics are Judge Frank's.) The clause "via
a fiction" in the above statement seems to mean that Judge Frank objects mainly to the
presumption, not the turnover-contempt process in general.
Judge Frank also believes that "one consequence of the fiction is that respondent
may be twice punished for the same ;_,ffense." Ibid.
88
As a psychological factor, at least. On courts' action as governmental action
for the purposes of due process clauses, see 45 M1cH. L. REv. 733 (1947).
89
Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 at 467, 63 S.Ct. 1241 (1943).
40 Western and Atlantic R.R. v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639, 49 S.Ct. 445 (1929).
84

94°
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does not discuss these issues, they are surely a consideration in the
Court's disapproval of the rigid use of the presumption. The Court
states that one-time possession should serve only as one fact among
many considered in the issue of plaintiff's ability to comply.
Even if we concede that the constitutional barriers are hurdled,
we must decide whether the policy supporting the presumption is one
warranting its use. The Maggio case is a powerful blow at the entire
turnover procedure. Without sweeping use of the presumption of continuing possession, the trustee is usually without evidence. Can this
result be called desirable?
We have assumed that the turnover procedure usually gains assets
for the bankrupt's creditors. Superficially, at least, that assumption
seems justified. The case reports, however, are no help if we would
consider practical consequences. Men experienced in the day to day
workings of bankruptcy must be consulted. And they are not in agreement. Judge Augustus Hand feels that the process yields dollars-andcents results. 41 Judge McPherson agrees. 42 Mr. McGovern is convinced that the turnover procedure is so helpful" that the burden of
persuasion should be placed on the bankrupt when the issue of inability to comply is raised.43 But Judge Learned Hand disagrees: "It
would not disturb us· that without the presumption such proceedings
would generally fail, except when they were directed against specific
articles like books of account. We are not persuaded that after allowances and expenses are all paid, substantial sums often reach the creditors...." 44 He says further: "And though it were not so, it would
be at too high a cost that the law should proceed in the face of a baser
ignor~nce which it dares not aver and must cover by a transparent
fiction; such abuse of its processes discredits it generally and impairs
its integrity, which in the end depends on unswerving allegiance to the
truth, so far as truth is accessible." 45
3
But the Maggio case reached the Supreme Court in its second
stage, the contempt proceeding. Generally, an equity decree _cannot be
41 "Nor am I persuaded that the creditors of thieving bankrupts should be curtailed in employing the only practical means of obtaining restitution and one which
frequently results in substantial recoveries." Concurring opinion, Robbin v. Gottbetter, (C.C.A. 2d, 1943) 134 F. (2d) 843 at 845.
42 See In re Epstein, (D.C. Pa. 1913) 206 F. 568, affd., Epstein v. Steinfeld,
(C.C.A. 3d, I<}l4) 210 F. 236, quoted at length by Chief Justice Taft in Oriel v.
Russell, 278 U.S. 358 at 366, ·49 S.Ct. 173 (1929).
43 McGovern, "Aspects of the Turnover Proceeding in Bankruptcy," 9 FORDHAM
L. REv. 313 at 332 (1940).
44 Seligson v. Goldsmith, (C.C.A. 2d, 1942) 128 F. (2d) 977 at 979.
45 lbid.
·
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collaterally attacked,4° and Oriel v. Russell 41 held that the turnover
order is res judicata in the contempt action. In his dissent, Justice
Frankfurter states that in the Maggio case the time had passed for
repairing any damage caused by the presumption of continued possession. If Oriel v. Russell precludes examination of the turnover
order, how can defendant purge his contempt by simply continuing
his denial of the taking? Although there was no unanimity before the
Maggio case, the lower federal courts seemed to sustain Justice Frankfurter's interpretation of the Oriel opinion.48 Only after an indefinite
time in jail has "shown" that defendant does not retain the goods
should he be released.49 But as Justice Jackson points out, the turnover-contempt procedure is unlike the usual contempt action so far as
attacking the original finding is concerned. "In the two successive
proceedings the same question of possession and ability to produce the
goods is at issue, but as of different points of time." 60 The majority in
the Maggio case 9elieve that mere passage of time may constitute a
"change of facts." Justice Frankfurter would demand that the change
be of a more substantial nature.
It is almost impossible to pigeon-hole the result~ as to "desirability" or "undesirability." The threat of imprisonment is materially
reduced by the Maggio holding. The contempt committal has been
used as a kind of experiment-to see whether defendant still controls
the property he took. "I have known brief confinement to produce
the money promptly, thus justifying the court's incredulity, and I
46 Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181, 42 S.Ct. 277 (1922), and cases cited. See
note, 59 HARV. L. REv. 293 (1945); Krentler-Arnold Hinge Last Co. v. Leman,
(C.C.A. 1st, 1931) 50 F. (2d) 699, affd., 284 U.S. 448, 52 S.Ct. 238 (1932). If
Justice Black's view were adopted, however, this rule might be of no avail: collateral attack is said to be effective if the court originally had no "jurisdiction over the subject
matter." In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200, 8 S.Ct. 482 (1888). But see 45 M1cH. L.
REv. 469 at 499 (1947); and United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S.
258, 67 S.Ct. 677 (1947).
47 278 U.S. 358, 49 S.Ct. 173 (1929). See L. Hand, J., In re Frankel, (D.C.
N.Y. 19n) 184 F. 539·
48 See 42 ILL. L. REv. 396 at 399 (1947). And see In re Epstein, (D.C.
Pa. 1913) 206 F. 568, affd., Epstein v. Steinfeld, (C.C.A. 3d, 1914) 210 F. 236,
quoted at length by Chief Justice Taft in the Oriel case, 278 U.S. 358 at 366, 49
S.Ct. 173 (1929).
The alimony analogy seems to support the majority. See cases in note 16, supra.
Chief Justice Taft also cites Hurd v. Hurd in his Oriel opinion, id. at 365.
49 See, however, In re Roxy Liquor Corp., (C.C.A. 7th, 1939) 107 F. (2d)
533, where bankrupt's fifty-four days in jail failed to rebut the presumption of possession. The statement in Clements v. Coppin, (C.C.A. 9th, 1934) 72 F. (2d) 796
at 799, has substantial support in dicta: "The inability of the offender to comply with
the order may at any time, in its discretion, on a proper application, be inquired into
by the District Court." See 5 REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY, 4th ed., § 2428 (1936).
lio Principal case at 410.
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have also known it to fail." 51 This experimentation is obviously a
hardship on an innocent bankrupt.52 It is equally obvious that a
trustee's threat is enfeebled by the Maggio case, if we assume that the
bankrupt is guilty.53 Policies of efficient bankruptcy administration and
protection of the innocent debtor conflict. Whether or not the result is
desirable. depends upon which of these policies is emphasized.
T. L. Tolan, Jr., S.Ed.

51 ln re Epstein, (D.C. Pa. 1913) 206 F. 568, affd., Epstein v. Steinfeld, (C.C.A.
3d, 1914) 210 F. 236, quoted by Chief Justice Taft in the Oriel case, 278 U.S. 358
at 366.
112 One facet of that hardship may be deduced from the fact that bankruptcy no
longer carries the social stigma that imprisonment does. See Radin, "Debt," 5 ENcYc.
Soc. Sc1. 2 at 38 (1931).
53 The easiest way out, of course, is to apply the presumption of continued possession and the contempt committal only to those who are guilty and who .still have the
goods.

